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Abstract
This article presents the problem of illicit collusion between states, organized criminals and 
white-collar criminals in the post-Soviet region, showing the blurring of these phenomena. 
The paper charts the development of political corruption and argues that this is a particular 
problem in the region due to the way state resources were sold off during the 1990s. The pa-
per however shows that the countries of the region now diverge significantly in terms of the 
extent and form that collusion takes. The goal of the paper is understand this variation. The 
paper suggests that roughly two broad categories of state now exist in the post-Soviet region, 
excluding the Baltic States. These are broadly politically competitive states such as Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia and broadly politically non-competitive ones such as Russia, Belarus 
or Kazakhstan. I show that collusion takes differing forms across these categories due to the 
effect that the presence or absence of political competition has. In conclusion I argue that the 
post-Soviet region provides little evidence to believe that political competition actually re-
duces corruption and collusion. However, some cases from the region show that successful 
anti-corruption campaigns are more likely where there is more political contestation. 
 
Introduction
In 2010, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine, Mykola Azarov, gave a revealing speech. 
Azarov publicly admitted that  when working as Finance Minister (2002–4 and 2006–7) he 
had told other ministers: ‘have a conscience. [Steal] five per cent and the hell with you be-
cause there is no way  you can track this money down, but please, don’t steal 50 per cent. 
Show some conscience’ (Azarov 2010). This statement demonstrates the degree to which 
public office is accepted as a means for private gain in the post-Soviet region. As Azarov al-
ludes to, there are low moral costs to engaging in corrupt behavior, and without other mecha-
nisms to ‘track’ state officials a sense of impunity results. Recent events in Ukraine have 
shown that government ministers failed to take Azarov’s advice. As a result, Ukrainian people 
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themselves were left  to foster a conscience in their government officials through protest. Cor-
ruption was one of the major issues that brought people to Kiev to oust President Yanukovych 
from office in the spring of 2014, sparking conflict with Russia. 
This article attempts to understand the continuing influence of corruption and collu-
sion in the post-Soviet  region. Unlike countries that have developed strict divisions between 
the formal | informal, licit | illicit, public | private, and political power | economic wealth, 
these boundaries are commonly blurred in the post-Soviet context. This blurring often in-
volves some form of purposive coordination between organized criminals, state actors and 
businessmen. In all cases, the continued fuzziness of the borders between the state, business 
and organized crime is grounded in some form of political corruption. In this article, the 
criminal collaborations that make use of this political corruption will be referred to as collu-
sion. Despite common legacies, the extent and form of this collusion varies. There are sig-
nificant distinctions between the countries of the Baltic region, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova and the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. This article aims to provide a theo-
retical framework for understanding the variation in collusion within the region.
In essence, I argue here that, excluding the Baltic States, broadly two types of states 
exist in the post-Soviet region today. Levels of political competition distinguish these catego-
ries. There are non-competitive and centralized states, and competitive and centralized ones. 
These have emerged out of the chaotic and decentralised conditions of transition in the 1990s. 
These regime types exhibit  variation in the extent and form of corruption and collusion be-
tween states, white collar and organized crime. Moreover, collusion in each regime type has 
led to a status quo in which the interests of political and private actors do not permit signifi-
cant change. It is for this reason that serious reform in the region often only  comes from revo-
lutionary activity as seen in Ukraine recently, and previously in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. 
The most common type of state in the region now is the non-competitive and central-
ized type. In Russia or Kazakhstan, for example, the state is marked by high levels of cen-
tralisation of political power and by low political competition. There, the line between poli-
tics and organized crime is blurred due to the formal authorities’ involvement in various types 
of criminal activity. Corruption functions in highly  centralized pyramids where bribes are col-
lected in the lower ranks of bureaucracy and passed up the chain of command. The govern-
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ment also closely controls business in a setting that is often categorised as ‘state corporatism.’ 
Organized criminal groups have little independent room for maneuver and are usually closely 
controlled by the state. 
In contrast, other states are centralized but politically competitive. In Ukraine or Ar-
menia, corrupt actors such as organized criminals and unscrupulous business people have 
more bargaining capacity due to the diffusion and fragmentation of political power. In con-
trast to non-competitive states, political leaders in these places do not get everything their 
own way. They have to compete to capture some markets. Criminal and business interests 
have more choice over their patrons. 
 The goal of the paper is to give more depth and detail to such examples, in order to 
illuminate the way in which levels of political competition is affecting corruption and collu-
sion in the region. It suggests avenues for hypothesis building concerning relationships be-
tween political systems and collusion as well as asking questions about where anti-corruption 
strategies are more likely to emerge. First, I provide some definitions of political corruption 
and some background into the issue of corruption and collusion in terms of its development 
in the post-Soviet period. 
Soviet Legacies and Transition: The Development of Post-Soviet Collusion
In political science as well as criminology, scholars tend to distinguish between 
crimes committed by  public officials on behalf of the state and those they  perpetrate for pri-
vate advantage (Friedrichs 2007, Friedrichs and Rothe 2012). The former is usually under-
stood as state crime and the latter as political corruption. Philp’s (2008) approach to political 
corruption is the most comprehensive because it accommodates often-overlooked issues such 
as influence trading, systems of patronage, the use of legal means to deliver favours, and ille-
gal funding to groups rather than individuals that can indirectly lead to private gain (see also 
Yadav 2011). According to Philp (2008, p. 315), 
‘corruption in politics occurs where a public official (A), acting in ways that 
violate the rules and norms of office, and that involve personal, partisan or sec-
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tional gain, harms the interests of the public (B) (or some sub-section there-of) 
who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/or a 
third party  (C) who rewards or otherwise incentivises A to gain access to goods 
or services they would not otherwise obtain.’ 
I will use this definition of political corruption as the grounds for the collusion of states, 
business and organized crime in the post-Soviet region.
Collusive links between politics and organised crime date back to the roots of the So-
viet Union. The Soviet secret police drew heavily on criminals as informers and executioners, 
and Vladimir Lenin enlisted criminal groups to swell the treasury  of the fledgling Communist 
Party (Coulloudon 1997, p. 75.) Josef Stalin also used Soviet criminal groups in an attempt to 
destabilise Western economies by printing massive quantities of counterfeit money (Shelley 
in Godson 2003, p. 207). Through the Soviet era, bureaucrats who controlled state-owned 
enterprises extended their criminal ties to secure access to a black market that filled signifi-
cant gaps produced by incessant product shortages. Thess relationships, which transformed 
over time, ultimately helped shape a new elite in post-Soviet countries. 
The most powerful groups to emerge were those which incorporated former members 
of the Communist Party elite, former and serving members of the state security organs, an 
emerging class of post-Soviet entrepreneurs, and professional criminals. These entities main-
tained ‘one foot in the black market, the old criminal world, and another foot in the official 
world, the world of politics and the old structure of the party’ (Shelley  1994). Individuals 
once in charge of Soviet bureaucratic structures and industrial enterprise were left in posses-
sion of vast human, material and administrative resources. This situation provided an avenue 
through which the benefits of occupying political office or having access to political office at 
a time of privatization in the 1990s were quickly recognised. 
 Through the early  1990s, criminal groups gained significant  inroads in leveraging 
control over economic sectors of interest. Among the first  sectors they  targeted in Russia, es-
pecially between 1992 and 1996, was banking. Apart from the obvious benefit of simplifying 
money  laundering, banks allowed direct access to capital resources (either directly or at pref-
erential credit) and facilitated extortion and corruption. Banks thus were seen as holding a 
special kind of power in the market economy – they facilitated a way to further enmesh the 
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interests of these entities into the ‘foundations of the emerging Russian state’ (Lowther 1997). 
In August 1995, the MVD All-Russian Scientific Research Institute estimated that criminal 
groups operating in Russia alone controlled over 400 banks and 47 exchanges (Izvestia Ana-
lytical Centre 1994). 
Criminal groups infiltrated other sectors too, including the production of aluminum 
and coal mining. In 1997, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kulikov remarked in a 
speech to the Duma that the aluminum sector was ‘completely  criminalised despite remaining 
competitive in the world market’ (Kommersant Daily 1997). Political influence accompanied 
control over these industries, along with the ability to penetrate others, such as consumer 
markets, including alcohol and tobacco, the construction industry, the computer market, and 
the automobile sector. 
The Russian experience was replicated in other post-Soviet republics, albeit with 
varying degrees of collusion between legal and illegal actors. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
the alliances between state and organised crime emerged with shifting dominance between 
political and criminal leaders (Marat 2006). In Georgia, Jaba Ioseliani, a professional crimi-
nal and a member of a criminal elite caste born out of the prison camps of the Gulag and 
known as thieves-in-law, became one of the leading political figures in the 1990s. In Ukraine, 
regionally  based corrupt networks comprising criminals and politicians took over large shares 
of local economies (Shelley 2003).
 This period was essential in laying the framework for how private enterprise and state 
interests interacted in the post-Soviet context. Although the nexus between political and en-
trepreneurial actors was recognised, an undeveloped legal and regulatory framework was 
navigated in such a way as to conceal ownership. Dummy and front companies, straw men, 
and a maze of subsidiary firms became the norm of ownership structures. This nexus pro-
vided these composite groups with access to a plethora of foreign networks, providing routes 
to international markets, both for licit and illicit goods.
 As Ganev (2005) argues, the major point of departure in studying the development of 
post-Soviet societies is the redistribution of the huge state resources inherited from the Soviet 
system. Post-Soviet economic reform involved the hollowing out of the state and the redistri-
bution of its assets within tight circles of those with political influence.  Economic elites in 
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the post-Soviet region formed as a creation of state actors who distributed assets in the im-
mediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse (Easter 2012). Decisions about exactly who got the 
assets were most often grounded in political corruption. Competition for political influence 
often turned violent. Assassinations and murders of businessmen increased significantly in 
the early 1990s (Volkov 2002).
After this initial period of redistribution of wealth and the emergence of an ‘oligar-
chic’ class in the 1990s, the state in many countries of the region such as Russia, Belarus, 
Georgia and Kazakhstan re-gained coercive capacity  toward the end of the decade. In doing 
so, large criminal organizations and newly privatized business had to renegotiate their rela-
tionship  with state actors. Actors on illegal markets were displaced as state structures, and 
especially law enforcement structures, regained their strength in the 2000s. Thus, in Russia, 
for example, private security  with links to the FSB (formerly the KGB) developed a monop-
oly on the market for private protection (Volkov 2002, Favarel-Garrigues 2010). 
Despite an encroaching state and the weakening grip of organized crime groups on 
financial and political resources, criminal leaders remained influential in some areas. Organ-
ized crime is still often utilized by states for dealing with a number of problems including 
prison unrest or to control remote geographic areas under weak state control or simply to hide 
state involvement in hostile commercial takeovers. The use of organized crime groups for 
state purposes is the essence of the meaning of ‘mafia state’ a term used to describe Russia in 
the present day. This kind of state-organized crime relationship, forged out of the illicit net-
works that survived the turmoil of the 1990s, may allow the exercise of government authority 
(see Review Article, this issue). 
The practice of corporate raiding provides one of the best illustrations of the emergent 
fusion between organized crime and the state in the 2000s. This new form of extortion has 
emerged in those post-Soviet countries where businesses have a large cash flow, especially 
extractive industries or large factories such as in Russia or Ukraine. Referring to the illegal or 
improper transfer of assets, or the value generated from those assets, corporate raiding gener-
ally involves the improper coercive role of state authorities and the use of criminals as straw 
men. It includes other crimes such as counterfeiting of documents, registration of companies 
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under dummy names, bribing law enforcement and ‘buying’ court decisions (Zerkalov 2007, 
Rojansky 2013).
In understanding this development of this form of post-Soviet  collusion, some authors 
emphasize the legacies and resilience of Soviet understandings and governance patterns 
(Finckenauer and Voronin 2001) while others understand it as a product of the specific condi-
tions of the transition from the planned to a market economy (Volkov 2002, Gilinskiy  2002). 
The latter under-emphasizes the importance of path dependency in framing practices, rela-
tionships and the criminal opportunity  structures emerging from the experience of the Soviet 
period. Since post-communist Eastern European countries are far more corrupt than many 
other nation states, (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005), the obvious explanatory  factor, for this 
school of thought, can be found in patterns of communist social organisation that established 
power asymmetries, status groups and the practice of dealing with things informally  (Mungiu 
Pippidi 2013). In contrast, the former underestimates the extreme shock of the chaotic period 
of the early 1990s. In fact, the post-Soviet transition often created new opportunities for ex-
ploiting long-standing relationships, old practices and understandings (Karklins, 2005, 
Schmidt 2007). 
Despite similar historical trajectories and Soviet legacies, political corruption and col-
lusion now varies significantly across the post-Soviet region. The rest of this paper uncovers 
the ways in which the countries of the region have diverged and the relationship  of this diver-
gence to the type of political system that  has emerged. In particular, I look at the role of po-
litical competition and the centralization of power in influencing the extent of collusion 
across the countries of the region. 
From Chaos to Collusion: Dynamics of Political Competition and Centraliza-
tion
Political competition is generally held to be one of the most important mechanisms in 
controlling corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 149). A 
multitude of actors vying for power are more likely to monitor and hold each other in check 
(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2002, Grzymala-Busse 2003). However, the simple proposi-
tion that political competition reduces corruption lacks compelling empirical evidence 
7
(Svensson 2005). From the politically decentralized and chaotic conditions of the 1990s, state 
rebuilding in the region, in part due to informal collusive agreements, has resulted in broadly 
two types of state: politically centralized and non-competitive states on the one hand and po-
litically  centralized and competitive ones on the other. These two broad categories exhibit 
very different features now in terms of the form and depth of corruption and collusion, as I 
will show. As the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - were in the Soviet Union for 
a shorter period of time (1940-1991) and are now part of the EU and NATO, their trajectory 
has been exceptional and corruption and collusion have been significantly reduced. Thus, in 
what follows I discuss only post-Soviet states outside of the Baltics.
The tumultuous transitions in newly independent states led to the temporary collapse 
of central authority in the early 1990s. This made it difficult  for incumbent regimes to impose 
control over networks of corruption. The result  was an unpredictable environment where a 
myriad of corrupt officials maximised personal gains in competition with each other (Stefes 
2006). At a time of political weakness, organized crime assumed a quasi-governmental role in 
many places, not least Russia, Ukraine and Georgia meeting the demand for governance 
where the government could not (Finckenauer 2005, p. 74), including making and enforcing 
rules of conduct and settling disputes (Von Lampe 2003, p.16; Kelly 2003, p. 110). After the 
collapse of the Soviet state, career criminals from the Gulag penal subculture known as 
thieves-in-law emerged as one provider of extra-legal governance and protection in certain 
countries and territories, in particular Georgia, Armenia and Russia (Varese 2010, Slade 
2013). Criminal leaders and drugs traffickers, for example, dominated certain regions of Kyr-
gyzstan in the aftermath of the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 (Marat 2006, Kupatadze 2007).  
After such chaos, most countries of the region have stabilized, with a return to autoc-
racy  in many. A central authority  emerged in countries like Russia or Azerbaijan that controls 
political competitors and enforces illicit agreements in dividing spheres of influence and im-
posing monopoly prices for those who wish to buy influence. This type of collusion, stymy-
ing political competition, centralizes around one figure who can deter defection and informal 
rule-breaking. 
However, the region also includes examples, such as Ukraine or Moldova, of coun-
tries that have remained political competitive after the initial chaos. In these places, this com-
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petition actually continues to foster corruption and collusive networks. Influence between the 
nodes of these systems flows vertically and is patronage based – politicians link with busi-
ness and organized crime below them in political space. Economic and criminal elites seek to 
maintain the cracks and divisions in the political elite as a lack of monopoly  benefits them in 
creating vulnerabilities, lowering the rents by providing greater choice in the market for pa-
tronage. 
The table below shows the general movement of countries in the post-Soviet region 
from chaotic and decentralized regime types to politically centralized and either competitive 
or non-competitive types. This is not one-way travel. At times post-Soviet  states have moved 
back towards chaotic conditions, such as in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010. However, in gen-
eral, most countries have moved to a stable equilibrium. The table provides the basic features 
of the depth and form of collusion in these different  regime types. I then go on to give exam-
ples and describe these forms of collusion in more detail in the two types of regime – com-
petitive and non-competitive - that now predominate across the region.
Regime Type Extent and form of collusion Examples
Chaotic and decentral-
ized: dysfunctional 
states and states in 
transition
Political corruption is chaotic and violent. Organ-
ized criminals may take over the state. Unscrupulous 
business people and politicians loot state assets. As a 
result the state fails to provide public goods.
Early years of transition in most 
post-Soviet republics Georgia 
(1991-2004) Russia (1991-1996); 
Ukraine (1991-1994; 2004-2005) 
Kyrgyzstan (1991-1996; 2005-
2006), Tajikistan (1991-1996) 
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Regime Type Extent and form of collusion Examples
Non-competitive and 
centralized: autocra-
cies and emerging 
autocracies
The distinction between political corruption and 
organized crime is blurred. The state organizes pri-
vate economic collusion in return for patronage. 
State crime prevails and primarily benefits small 
political ruling groups. The state has coopted organ-
ized criminal activities and controls it.
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Bela-
rus, Uzbekistan, Russia, Ka-
zakhstan, Tajikistan 
Competitive and cen-
tralized: fragile de-
mocracies 
State actors cannot monopolize or control the gov-
ernance of collusive agreements. Businessmen have 
a choice of political patrons. Organized crime 
groups have leverage, as they possess a use value for 
political groups competing against each other. Anti-
corruption campaigns aim at weakening political 
opponents. The authenticity of such campaigns de-
pends on the cohesion and values of the ruling elite.
Ukraine,  Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, 
Moldova, Georgia
Table 1: to show the change from chaotic and decentralized regime types to centralized and 
either competitive or non-competitive regime types and the forms of collusion that accom-
pany these.
Non-competitive and centralized regimes
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The non-competitive and centralized regime type is the dominant category across post-Soviet 
Eurasia. Incumbent politicians in this type are the dominant actors. They  control business and 
criminal networking. Organized crime is mainly at the service of the incumbent regime and 
develops in a framework defined by it. The position of economic actors is guaranteed by the 
state and as such business is subservient to politics.
Central Asian autocracies such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the 
best examples of this form of regime. These countries have a high degree of political centrali-
zation; one coherent  authority controls the distribution of rents and sits at the top of a corrupt 
system. High centralization also means that the relationship between the state and organized 
crime is often dominated by the incumbent ruling elites who possess significant resources 
rather than particular criminal leaders (Kupatadze 2012). Thus, organized crime in many 
Central Asian countries is at the mercy of the state and utilized by  it. Organized criminals 
work on behalf of the state, pressuring political opponents and opposition social movements. 
Most traditional organized criminal activities such as extortion rackets have been taken over 
by the representatives of state institutions especially law enforcement structures. The distinc-
tion between political corruption and organized crime is hard to find.
In many post-Soviet Central Asian countries strategic partnerships have formed be-
tween drug traffickers and state actors around the exploitation of drug rents with some of the 
drugs smuggling operations run by law enforcement officials (De Danieli 2014). As a conse-
quence the term ‘werewolves in epaulettes’ has become popular in the media and everyday 
language, referring to policemen who engage in corrupt and criminal behaviour. There appear 
to be certain individuals or groups of individuals with varying extents of power and links to 
higher political leadership inside the police institutions of many Central Asian autocracies, 
and these groups run or protect organized criminal activity. However, if this involvement 
reaches the highest ranks as it  did in Niyasov’s Turkmenistan (Lewis 2010), it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to draw the line between institutional and individual involvement. 
Depending on the particular sector of the economy, relations between the government 
and economic actors are either imposed by a dominant actor, that is most likely the incum-
bent regime, or built through mutually  beneficial contracts and ‘exchange’ of favors and serv-
ices (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2004, 2010; Yakovlev, 2010, Frye 2002). State corporatism is 
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the dominant pattern. Despite the official denunciation of strong state intervention in the 
economy, the ruling regimes have consolidated control over the major natural resources in-
cluding energy sector and maintain control through state-owned corporations. An example of 
this is Russia. The fractious nature of the early years of Boris Yeltsin’s rule (1992-1995), in 
which political competition was solved with tanks on the street and business disputes were 
settled with guns, was stabilized by collusive agreements between political and economic 
elites. Yeltsin was able to centralize and hold power through quid pro quo illicit agreements, 
patronage and bargaining. In 1999, he handed over this ‘systema’ of collusive power to Vla-
dimir Putin (see Review Article, this issue). 
Putin has continued to hold power through this system. He has further centralized and 
reduced political and economic competition through cooptation of political parties and social 
movements and the threat of both re-nationalization of privatized state assets or direct  seizure 
and transfer of company ownership – known as ‘raiding’, as mentioned above. The new term 
‘state oligarch’ originated in 1990s Russia when a number of high-ranking government offi-
cials were installed in the boardrooms of major corporations (Frydman, Murphy and Rapac-
zynski 1998). State corporatism undermines the general standards of transparency and ac-
countability because fiscal and regulatory institutions are weak and elites do not favor institu-
tions that would constrain their behavior (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2006). Companies under 
direct or indirect ownership of the political elite get most of the public contracts.  
 Political corruption is rampant and corruption in the lower ranks of bureaucracy  is 
often tolerated. The leadership  prefers political stability to the kinds of reforms required by 
anti-corruption that would investigate the elite. There are temporary declarations against mal-
feasance but these are usually a reaction to international events. For example, a campaign in 
autocratic and majority Muslim Azerbaijan began immediately after the events of the Arab 
Spring (Rosenblum 2011).  Campaigns of this type do not usually go beyond the arrest of 
several medium and lower ranking bureaucrats and they have no substantial impact. Non-
competitive regimes are still interested in their international image and can use anti-
corruption rhetoric to clean up the ranks of disloyal elites. 
 In these non-competitive post-Soviet states, the incumbent regimes have invested sig-
nificant resources into strengthening their coercive apparatus. Such policies have eradicated 
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purely  criminal groups involved in large-scale drug smuggling or corporate raiding of a large 
enterprise, without the tolerance, endorsement, protection or involvement of state actors. The 
representatives of government become part of the problem of organized crime, rather than 
passive victims (Woodiwiss 2000). Rent-seeking officials in law enforcement structures take 
over many traditional criminal activities, including extortion rackets. State officials become 
the most effective criminals (Chambliss 1999, p. 156).
 In this non-competitive regime type, there is wide-ranging evidence of police in-
volvement in organized crime (see Light et al, this issue). Interactions police with organized 
crime take several forms including a merger between police officials and criminal groups or 
the takeover of criminal activities by police officials. In Russia, thousands of police personnel 
are officially punished annually for different kinds of law violations including corrupt prac-
tices however this is likely only the tip of the iceberg (Beck and Robertson 2009).  In a well-
known scandal in the late 1990s, a group  of Russian high-ranking policemen ran a criminal 
organization that engaged in blackmail and the racketeering of businessmen, trading in fire-
arms and fabricating cases (Zernova 2012). 
Thus, in terms of collusion, two key features stand out in the autocracies that  have 
proliferated across the post-Soviet region. One is the blurring of state and organized crime 
and the use of organized criminals for state purposes. The second is the subordination of the 
economic elite and business to the interests of the state through collusive agreements en-
forced by  state actors through patronage relationships. These relationships may be established 
and organized through violence or the threat  of violence emanating from state-organized 
crime. Thus, the state, business and organized crime become heavily blurred. 
The other states of the region resemble fragile democracies where some degree of po-
litical competition occurs. Many of these regimes, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
have aspirations towards the European Union. Collusion here takes on very different forms, 
which I discuss below.
Competitive and centralized regime type
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In the competitive and centralized regime type, the incumbent regime and hence the 
state is still the dominant actor.  However, business people and criminal leaders have more 
room to maneuver due to several loci of power in a politically  contested environment. Politi-
cal elites are often keen to use criminal leaders in political battles especially  for bullying po-
litical and economic competitors, blackmailing investigative journalists or as the muscle dur-
ing the public demonstrations. 
In this regime type, organized crime and the state function in an uneasy equilibrium. 
On the one hand, under certain conditions criminal leaders may try to dictate their interests. 
Prison riots in 2005 and 2010 appeared to counteract the state offensive against organized 
crime (Kupatadze 2013). Similarly, in Georgia, prison riots in 2006 were perceived as at-
tempts to destabilize the political elite by organized criminals. On the other hand, political 
elites can enlist the help  of organized crime. In Ukraine, the titushki, government-funded 
street-fighting young men, intimidated the activists of anti-Yanukovych protest in 2014. 
Some of these are almost certainly involved in organized crime (Salem and Stack 2014). 
As these protests of 2014 have shown, Ukraine differs from its neighbours, Russia 
and Belarus, in one important respect: politics remain contested at the top. This contest has 
created incentives to use clientelism to mobilize supporters. This was the case in post-Orange 
Revolution Ukraine (2004-2005) when the struggle between President Viktor Yuschenko and 
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko led to a dysfunctional state apparatus partitioning over a 
struggle for influence. Like Ukraine, in Kyrgyzstan political competition has not led to de-
creasing levels of corruption. Instead, competition has degenerated into a corrupt game of 
buying patronage between various political factions (Kupatadze 2012). In Kyrgyzstan, crimi-
nal leaders played a role in the re-distribution of spoils following two revolutions in 2005 and 
2010 (Kupatadze 2007, Delo No 2010). Rysbek Akmatbaev a widely  influential and popular 
criminal mobilized his business resources and supporters to challenge the newly installed 
government and force it into negotiations. Another influential criminal-turned-politician, 
Bayaman Erkinbaev played a major role in Southern Kyrgyzstan and became governor of the 
region after the Tulip Revolution in 2005. In such fragile democracies as Kyrgyzstan and 
Ukraine low-capacity institutions are unable to channel political interest. Competing elites 
then split along any  number of dimensions, including societal, ideological, class, ethnic, lin-
guistic, religious or regional divisions. 
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In Ukraine, these divisions were largely regional (east versus west), ethnic (Ukrainian 
versus Russian) and class-based (variations in regional industries). These divisions clearly 
overlap. The struggle to control assets by different factions, and profit from them, became a 
major element of Ukrainian politics. This struggle was enflamed by  the fact  that privatization 
came about slowly and unevenly, controlled by entrenched corrupt interests. Political contes-
tation also resulted in the prosecution of former Prime Ministers (Pavlo Lazarenko and Yulia 
Tymoshenko) on charges of corruption. It  remains unclear whether these individuals were in 
fact any more corrupt than their successors or predecessors because the exercise of ‘justice’ 
has been politically charged. However, Ukraine shows how a higher degree of political com-
petition can lead to mutual monitoring and attempts to expose corrupt networks. 
Political contestation also explains the emergence of a scandal involving government 
ministers in Moldova. Here the ministers of Finance, Culture and Health, faced corruption 
charges in 2013. Analysts argue that this anti-corruption action was ignited by  splits in the 
ruling government coalition. One political faction close to the National Anti-Corruption Cen-
ter decided to expose the ministers (Agence France-Presse February 13, 2013). 
In Kyrgyzstan, elite divisions are based on regional and clannish differences. Kyrgyz-
stan and Ukraine follow the pattern established by research that shows how ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is positively correlated with corruption indices (Mauro 1995, Easterly and 
Levine 1997, Kingston 2003). In such cases, different ethnic elites seize their share in the 
pool of assets (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). Each fraction can seek rents from re-
gional bureaucracies, government ministries or sectors of the economy. Competition over 
these assets can be an uncoordinated process, where actors do not take into account the effect 
of their actions on the interets of others (Easterly and Levin 1997, p.1214-5), or a coordinated 
action that rests on an implicit agreement to cooperate in extracting wealth (Gebara 2007). In 
the latter case, the outcome is a collusive alliance between various informal networks that 
exacerbates the entanglement of state, business and organized crime. Elite competition over 
resources within these entanglements perhaps explains the frequency  of revolutions in Kyr-
gyzstan (one in 2005 and one in 2010) (Gullette 2010). A vivid illustration of this frenzied 
rivalry for influence is the appointment of three different heads of customs over five days by 
three competing political groupings of the transitional government of Kyrgyzstan (24.kg, 
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2010). Thus, collusive agreements in Kyrgyzstan appear weak and unstable, creating political 
turbulence.
 In contrast, Armenia, while not a full autocracy, has lower levels of competition and 
stable and strong collusive agreements. Here there is a collusive monopoly over the distribu-
tion of rents. Political factions illicitly cooperate to extract illicit rents from those looking to 
buy protection and influence. After the 2008 presidential elections in Armenia, in which 
peaceful protest was bloodily  suppressed, three large networks emerged around two former 
and one acting president. The business sector has been organized into several informal 
commodity-based cartels and semi-monopolies in specific economic sectors or geographic 
regions. This is especially true for the trade in commodities such as sugar, flour and alcoholic 
beverages (Nranyan 2012, BTI 2012). Politicians governing these cartels enjoy parliamentary 
immunity  and ‘represent a convergence between corporate, state, and in some cases even 
criminal interests’ (BTI 2012). Monopolists help  incumbents to fake, and thereby win, elec-
tions and in return for political support incumbents allow monopolists into formal politics 
(Giragosian 2003, Danielyan 2005). 
As these examples from the post-Soviet region show, even when clear competing po-
litical actors emerged within fragile democracies, these did not hold each other to account. 
Instead, they worked within a system in which the moral costs of engaging in corrupt behav-
ior were low and independent monitoring by a robust media did not exist. In such situations, 
political actors simply competed to attract patronage. In such a scenario, political competition 
was only  won with more corruption not less corruption. This was the case for example in 
Ukraine, a country marked by a dynamic, but under-regulated, process of political contesta-
tion. Ukraine is not perceived as much cleaner than autocratic Belarus (Transparency Interna-
tional 2013). 
Yet, anti-corruption campaigns in competitive regimes are more frequent than in non-
competitive ones but are also often politically motivated. However, unlike the non-
competitive and centralized regime type, these campaigns may actually go far enough to 
touch the upper ranks of bureaucracy and push public attitudes to demand change. In certain 
cases for instance in Kyrgyzstan (since 2010) and Armenia (since 2012) there has been some 
willingness among political elites to change – for instance in both countries ‘one stop shops’ 
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have been introduced to streamline and simplify  business registration processes (EBRD 
2012). However, anti-corruption strategies are poorly  designed and often undermined by  the 
‘spoiler trap’ – the vested interests of entrenched networks that oppose any  reform. Hence 
these strategies often fail because they target particular individuals or institutions instead of 
changing the rules of the game.
 Georgia provides one example of an anti-corruption campaign that has attracted a lot 
of praise and is perceived as successful (Kupatadze 2012). Protests over entrenched corrup-
tion in a relatively competitive political atmosphere led to regime change in 2004. The new 
government targeted corruption and lack of transparency. Removing corrupt police, simplify-
ing bureaucratic procedures, prosecuting politicians with links to organized crime and shak-
ing down tax evading businessmen, their tactics were controversial but effective. While not 
as autocratic as countries such as Russia and Belarus, Georgia achieved gains in the fight 
with corruption due to a highly cohesive, relatively youthful and disciplined political elite 
that clamped down on the collusive arrangements of the past as well as reducing political 
competition. This elite was western-oriented. The key  variable of leadership orientation 
meant that Georgia’s increasingly autocratic leadership attempted to dismantle collusive ar-
rangements rather than appropriate them. However, the Georgian model of reducing collusion 
came at large social costs and damage to democratic accountability. It also emerged in very 
specific conditions of revolution that seem unlikely to be emulated in other countries of the 
region for now.
Conclusion
As the events in Ukraine in 2014 have shown, collusion and corruption can be direct 
causes of protests and destabilization. Political, economic and criminal elites blur into one 
another. This paper attempted to understand collusion in post-Soviet Eurasia from a broad 
perspective. In what ways does collusion differ across the region and why? 
As I have shown, from a chaotic and decentralized transition period the countries of 
the region, excluding the Baltic States, can be divided into two broad categories. These are 
roughly non-competitive, autocratic regimes and competitive, fragile democracies. I have 
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suggested that these two regime types exhibit variation in the form and extent of collusion in 
them. Fragile democracies at  least  provide the possibility for a genuine attack on collusion, as 
the case of Georgia, however controversially, shows. Unfortunately, the predominant regime 
type in the region is non-competitive autocracy. These regimes, from Russia to Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan, possess dominant ruling elites that collude to control business and organized 
crime. 
 In thinking about the wider lessons of this discussion, former Soviet Union countries 
possess some exceptionality  due to the legacy of the strong Soviet state when compared to 
Latin America or parts of Africa. Post-Soviet  countries exhibit the legacies of the experience 
of ‘the relentless enforcement of a monistic organization and ideology’ (Beissinger and Craw-
ford 2002, p. 24). This experience of a strong state at least partially  explains the relative ca-
pacity of the reemergence of ambitious post-Soviet political elites that aim to dominate and 
organize collusion in autocratic countries. The predominance of states to control collusion 
through violent resources in the post-Soviet region is higher than, for example, their African 
counterparts (Reno 2002). This means that post-Soviet organized crime has had less capacity 
for independent action in most post-Soviet countries and was coopted or replaced by repre-
sentatives of the state toward the early 2000s (Volkov 2002). 
 On other hand, post-Soviet institutions show greater cohesion and still provide some 
public goods in the tradition of the Soviet state, hence the genuine popularity  of autocrats 
such as Putin in Russia or Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Post-Soviet state institutions pursue 
interests greater than the sum of the private interests of individuals while postcolonial African 
states, for example, have been transformed into instruments solely  for the pursuit of private 
ambition (Reno 2002, Medard 2009). The extent of regime involvement in the drugs trade 
may be similar under some circumstances for example in the case of Bakiev’s Kyrgyzstan 
(Kupatadze 2014) and contemporary Guinea-Bissau (O’Regan and Thompson 2013) but the 
Kyrgyz state has still always been better able to deliver public goods than many African or 
Latin American states with similar drug trafficking problems. 
 The non-competitive and centralized regime type can be observed in many world re-
gions, for example contemporary  Venezuela (Ruiz and Flores 2009) or Charles Taylor’s Libe-
ria (Reno 1995). In these countries too, state structures dominate over criminal actors and 
large-scale criminal activities are rarely implemented without some kind of state involve-
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ment. Elsewhere, the competitive and centralized regime type is more applicable. In Latin 
America, a number of countries fall under this category  including Bolivia, Colombia, Guy-
ana, Guatemala, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. In 
these countries the state is still relatively weak and fragmentation of political power allows 
collusion between the state and organized crime (Ruiz and Flores 2009). There are differ-
ences within these cases. For example in Mexico drug trafficking has always been dominated 
by the law enforcement structures that were designed to fight it while in Columbia the drugs 
trade initially  developed among independent of political actors (Ruiz and Flores 2009) before 
drug traffickers penetrated politics.  
 Post-Soviet Eurasia differs from other world regions in at least two other aspects. 
First, in the former Soviet Union there is a long-established pattern of military subservience 
to the state while in many  other parts of the world including some African states (Beissinger 
and Crawford 2002), Egypt (Abul-Magd 2013), Panama (Perez 2000) or Ecuador (Mani 
2010) armies remain key  players in the economy. Hence armies are often independent or 
semi-independent actors in crony capitalist systems that add to the dynamics of corruption in 
these countries. Second, as elaborated above, the nexus between politics and business is 
much more ingrained given the initial role of the state in the redistribution and privatization 
of state assets in the 1990s (Ganev 2005). Generally, cross-regional comparisons especially 
with Africa and Latin America are lacking and could become a fruitful area of further re-
search.
This paper suggests that political competition delineates the nature of corruption and 
collusion in the post-Soviet region. It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss fully how 
to tackle the blurring of states with organized and white-collar crime. Where greater competi-
tion exists, I have found that organized crime and business interests can exploit that competi-
tion and influence the state. However, political competition provides at least  the possibility 
for robust anti-corruption campaigns. The experience of Georgia and the Baltic States sug-
gests that a break with the past in which cohesive elites emerge with an agenda based on 
genuine commitment to reform is vitally important. So too is engagement from Western states 
and institutions. However, even in the cases of success stories political corruption and the in-
terwoven networks of corrupt influence remain problematic. Low-level bureaucratic corrup-
tion is addressed while parts of the political elite may still be involved in corruption. Still, 
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fragile democracies in the region – the most pressing example is today’s Ukraine - are still 
the most likely future corruption fighters and therefore deserve support, even if they  are much 
weaker in the present day than the autocracies of the region. 
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